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1. Introduction  
     The critical issue for financial economists studying conflicts of interest in financial 
institutions is the balance between the value added of an institution and the potential harm 
arising from conflicts of interest. A conflict of interest is defined as a situation in which a party 
to the transaction can gain at the expense of another party. Its occurrence does not necessarily 
mean that, in equilibrium, it will result in an economic loss. . As discussed in Mehran and Stultz 
(2007), the many potential conflicts of interest for investment banks are typically accompanied 
by a variety of mechanisms that control the impact of conflicts of interest. Bolton, Freixas and 
Shapiro (2007) develop a theory that models the interplay between conflicts of interest and their 
impact. The model predicts when profit margins are equal across products, conflicts will have 
less of an impact for the clients of an integrated financial institution than a of specialized 
institution. The question of whether the mechanisms actually control conflicts is ultimately an 
empirical one. We examine this question by testing whether diversification of activities within 
financial institutions adds value to assets under management due to information links or subtracts 
value due to conflicts of interest. The literature has ignored the large portfolios of publicly traded 
assets operated by investment banks with the exception of Massa and Rehman (2008) and Ritter 
and Zhang (2007) both of whom focus on bank operated mutual funds. This is surprising given 
that investment banking is highly regulated and now, publicly supported. To fill the gap, we 
compare asset management services offered by investment banks with the same services offered 
by specialized firms, which do not engage in the range of activities of an investment bank.  
     Since investment banks operate many types of portfolios, any study of investment banking 
and portfolio management will inevitably require an examination of the economics of investment 
contracts. Investors who do not directly invest their money must not only choose the type of 
 4 
organization that manages their investments but also the type of contract that governs the 
relationship with the manager. The efficiency of the contract form is clearly important for 
researchers in evaluating whether investment banks add or subtract value compared to other 
organizations.. Existing studies of contract form such as  Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscraft, 
(1999) and Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi (2010), only compare mutual funds with hedge funds 
and, with the exception of the “side by side” comparison in Cici, Gibson and Moussawi (2010), 
they do not control for differences in the companies that offer these portfolios. Variation in assets 
under management, centralization of information gathering and trading, economies of scale, 
transactions costs levels and risk control, can create risk-return differences across portfolio type.     
A distinguishing feature of this study is the comparison of the investment performance of three 
types of delegated portfolios: mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds. We compare 
portfolios owned by investment banks versus those owned by non-bank financial services groups, 
which we simply call financial conglomerates. Our sample consists of all financial groups, both 
investment banks and financial conglomerates,  that managed all three types of portfolios for at 
least one year during 1990-2008 and reported their performance data to widely available 
databases. There are twenty three investment banks and forty eight non-investment banks in our 
data. We examine the impact of investment banks - and the investor contract form - on the alphas 
of all portfolios that these financial groups operated during the time period. We compare 
investment banks only with other financial groups to control for the effect of omitted variables. 
Comparing investment bank operated portfolios to portfolios not in a financial group is likely to 
increase the effect of omitted variables because comprehensive investment organizations 
centralize services that portfolio managers commonly demand.  
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     To examine the risk-return differences, we estimate alphas on unsmoothed returns using the 
moving average process developed by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) to account for 
differences in portfolio exposure to various risk factors. We use a seven factor model with time-
varying alphas similar to Agarwal and Naik (2000).We test the hypothesis that investment banks 
produce different alphas relative to non-bank conglomerates by examining the cross-sectional 
regression of fund alphas on control variables and type of organization. Our tests show that the 
form of the contract offered to investors does not matter once the control variables are included. 
While the contract form is occasionally significant in year by year regressions, competition 
equalizes the impact of the three contract forms across time. It is clear that the control variables 
are a critical part of explaining the difference between types of contracts. However, when the 
data are confined to a single contract we see that these organizations appear to be optimized for 
institutional clients since the control variables do not matter for institutional funds. For hedge 
funds and mutual funds, the control variables are significant.  
     Our findings show that the organizational ownership structure matters. On average, investors 
experience a lower alpha of 46 basis points per year when an investment bank operates a fund. 
The harm is largely borne by mutual fund investors and depends on the fee dispersion across 
portfolios offered by the investment bank and the participation of the investment bank in lead 
loans during the year. It does not depend on equity or debt underwriting business. The greater the 
fee dispersion, the more the harm; the more the participation in lead loans the lower the harm. 
The effect of investment bank ownership is material amounting to at least $93 billion loss over 
the 19 year sample but the dollar loss is time-varying. For 14 years of the 19 year sample the 
costs of being owned by a bank were higher than the benefits. There were only five years, 1993-
1994 and 2001-2003, where the benefits of being owned by an investment bank outweighed the 
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costs.     The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops 
the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample collection process and introduces descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 discusses our procedures for correcting selection biases in our sample and the 
methodology for testing our hypotheses; Section 5 discusses results, while Section 6 concludes.  
2. Hypotheses 
2.1  Conflicts of interests for investment banking 
The Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2007) model predicts that an integrated financial institution 
is more capable of offering an appropriate product for a customer simply because it has more 
products than a specialized financial firm. However, this also gives the integrated firm more 
opportunities to offer inappropriate products. In the model, the financial institution maximizes 
profits net of the reputation cost of lying to customers. If the reputation cost is sufficiently high, 
then there is no conflict of interest. However, Mehran and Stulz (2007) argue that reputation 
costs are likely not high enough to eliminate conflict of interest and  Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro 
carefully examine the case where reputation costs are lower than profits. They show (in 
proposition 2) that all conflicts are eliminated if the gross margins are the same across products. 
Equal gross margins for products eliminates the incentive to misdirect the customer into 
inappropriate but profitable products.  Mehran and Stulz (2007) observe that in a perfectly 
competitive market for asset management services, products will have the same profit margins.  
Cabral and Santos (2001) use a model with a different focus and develop the incomplete 
contracting between the client and the financial institution. Their financial institution is better 
informed, which creates a moral hazard problem. By exploiting its superior information to take 
advantage of a relationship with a client, the financial institution takes the risk of jeopardizing 
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future transactions with that client. If selling multiple products increases the likelihood and 
number of future transactions, a financial institution selling multiple products bears a reputation 
cost of engaging in a conflict of interest. Both theories suggest that multiproduct firms both have 
more potential conflicts of interest and more incentives than specialized firms to reduce the costs 
of their conflicts of interest. These theories motivate our focus on comparing investment banks, 
which are multiproduct financial institutions, with specialized asset managers. 
The benefits of a fund being affiliated with a multiproduct firm is generally described by 
Mehran and Stultz (2007) as the “re-usability” of information. Here the information generated by 
one product line (e.g. lending, analysts, underwriting) is employed by another product line (e.g. 
asset management) to generate value. The literature has evidence that the “re-usability” occurs 
with bank loans (Massa and Rehman, 2008), IPOs (Ritter and Zhang, 2007), and analysts (Irvine, 
Lipson, and Puckett, 2007). In each case, the costs of “re-usability” arise from conflicts of 
interest that are poorly controlled. Whether the multiproduct investment bank provides more net 
benefit to investors than a specialized firm will be reflected in the relative net return after all fees 
and transactions costs. We turn now to our hypotheses about portfolio types 
2.2. Portfolio type 
There are two questions concerning types of portfolios, (1) which contract form is likely 
to benefit or lose from an association with investment banks, and (2)which, if any, contract form 
is superior. Each contract specifies different cash flow claims and ownership rights for investors 
which reduce the agency costs between managers and clients. The portfolio manager is the agent 
who has more information about securities than the client who is the principal. Bhattacharya and 
Pfleiderer (1985) prove that if the preferences of managers can be observed then it is possible to 
design a contract that forces managers to reveal their information eliminating agency costs. In 
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practice, it is probably impossible for such a contract to be written. As a consequence, the 
investment business has evolved into three major segments with common contract features that 
attempt to control agency costs for the clients in those segments.  
 Existing studies of contract form suggest that four mechanisms help align these interests: 
incentive contracts, ownership structure, market forces, and government. The studies are mixed 
in their conclusions. Cici, Gibson, and Moussawi (2010) examine a sample of managers that 
manage side-by- side mutual funds and hedge funds finding evidence that side-by-side managers 
strategically transfer performance from mutual funds to hedge funds. Ackermann, McEnally, and 
Ravenscraft (1999) examine a sample of hedge fund data and find that the hedge funds industry 
consistently outperforms the mutual fund industry in terms of Sharpe ratios but do not beat 
standard market indices. They attribute some of the higher performance to incentive fees, but 
after finding that incentive fees cannot account for increased risk they explain hedge fund 
superiority by the regulatory differences between mutual funds and hedge funds.  
None of the preceding studies control for differences in the companies that offer these 
portfolios. Variations in assets under management, centralization of information gathering, 
economies of scale, transactions costs levels and risk control can create risk-return differences 
across portfolio type. Our paper extends the current literature by offering a cross industry 
performance comparison within a multifactor risk adjustment setting while controlling for 
conglomerate effects on fund performance. It is the first study to examine portfolios across the 
three managed fund industries. The examination of the effect of investment banks necessitates 
our study of the differences between the risk and return relationship that investors earn due to the 
form of the contract between managers and investors. The next section describes our specific 
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hypotheses based on balancing the benefits of re-usability of information and conflicts of interest. 
It also describes our hypotheses of whether organizational structure matters. 
2.3. Hypotheses  
Our study examines the differences between the risk and return relationship that an investor 
can expect to earn by investing in one of the three fund types, which we refer to as “portfolio 
hypotheses”, and whether these differences depend on ownership by an investment bank, which 
we refer to as “investment banking” hypotheses.  
Our baseline investment banking hypothesis is whether being owned by an investment bank 
adds value to the portfolios under management over being owned by a financial conglomerate. 
The hypothesis is strongly suggested by the theories of Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2007) and 
Cabral and Santos (2001). As discussed above, the theoretical literature on conflicts of interest 
suggests that competitive multiproduct firms will have fewer conflicts than specialized firm if 
profit margins are equal such as when the market is perfectly competitive. When the market 
profit margins are equal the multiproduct firm will match the product to the needs of the clients 
since a multiproduct firm has more products than a single product firm. In addition, multi-
product firms will be more interested in long term relationships. These studies imply that the sign 
of an investment banking dummy variable indicates value-added or subtracted in a regression 
mode, where a portfolio alpha is a function of the portfolio and organization characteristics1.  
We add to the baseline hypothesis by considering that the market for investment banking 
services may not be competitive enoughto resolve all conflicts. Relying on the model of Bolton, 
Freixas and Shapiro (2007) the dispersion in gross margins on financial products indicate the 
                                                 
1 The empirical studies find that banks have sources of information that enable asset managers to choose better 
securities. See the empirical work of Massa-Rehman (2008) and Ritter and Zhang (2007), as an example. 
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degree of conflicts of interest for a financial institution.  They define gross margins as the fees 
paid by investors less all costs of operating the fund. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the 
economic gross margins on managed portfolios but we believe fees of a fund are a reasonable 
proxy. First, the largest component of total fees is the management fee. For some funds this may 
precisely measure the economic gross margins but for others the accounting numbers do not 
necessarily measure the economic concept. However, it is well recognized that the management 
fee is independent of the costs of operating a fund and strategically determined.2 Second, the 
excess of total fee over management fee is not related to performance of a fund but to its size and 
the number of clients- at least for the small number of mutual funds in our sample where we can 
observe this difference.  While we can observe the management fee for some mutual funds, we 
cannot for pension funds and hedge funds.  The management fee is not reported separately from 
the total fee for these funds and the management fee is likely to be almost equal to the total fee 
since hedge funds and institutional funds do not have the costs of retail mutual funds serving 
many small clients. Third, the fund families with publicly traded equity, such as Blackrock (in 
our sample) and T. Rowe Price (not in our sample), have revenues that are highly correlated with 
profits over time3. Revenues are largely, even solely, dependent on fees times assets under 
management. These reasons suggest that fees are a reasonable proxy for the economic profit that 
are the focus of the Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro model.    
                                                 
2 A central feature of the Berk and Green (2004) model is that managers increase their fees to the point where 
expected returns to investors are competitive. Similarly, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz Verdu (2009) argue that fees are 
strategically set and that many high fee funds have low gross performance. 
3 Over the past ten years, the correlation between TROW’s revenue and income was 94%, for BLK it was 98%. 
Three other firms in our sample are publicly traded, “single product”, companies.  Franklin Resources which had a 
99% correlation, Diamond Hill Investment which had a 47% correlation and Calamos Asset Management which had 
a -21% correlation. The negative correlation is due to charges from a subsidiary that is not an asset management 
firm. 
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We use dispersion of fees to test our second investment banking hypotheses that 
multiproduct firms-investment banks with higher conflicts of interest should have a lower alpha 
to investors. The dispersion of fees in a year for a financial institution is a proxy for conflicts of 
interest. We expect that the cross-sectional dispersion of fees in year t for financial institution i 
will be negatively related to alphas for multiproduct firms - investment banks.  
  We define “portfolio hypotheses” as hypotheses that explain differences in abnormal 
returns due to contract type. Our first portfolio hypothesis is the management alignment 
hypothesis specifically, the greater the alignment of interests between management and clients, 
the higher the return. If interests are better aligned, agency costs are reduced in two ways. First, 
management will reveal the information (by actively trading securities) that adds value to the 
portfolio. Second, management will charge lower expenses for the value adding information and 
reduce hidden expenses such as soft dollars. Thus, we expect that the risk and return relationship 
will differ between the organizational forms (proxied by portfolio type) reflecting the variations 
in the degree of alignment4.  
Our second portfolio hypothesis is the flexibility hypothesis which we define as the fewer 
restrictions on the manager, the higher the return to clients. If fewer restrictions exist, 
management is better able to achieve an optimal return for the risk taken in an efficient market 
and better able to use the information that they have if they receive information that is not 
already reflected in the price of the security. Ceteris paribus, we expect hedge funds and 
institutional funds to perform better than mutual funds, which are restricted to liquid securities 
and diversified portfolios. Hedge fund managers invest their own funds, receive high bonus fees, 
can choose long and short positions in any asset and can follow a wide range of investment 
                                                 
4 See Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) discussion on how the principal-agent theoretical arguments 
by Holmstrom (1979) and Starks (1987) apply to the asset management.  
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strategies. Institutional funds are also subject to much less regulation than mutual funds but their 
clients allow them less flexibility than hedge funds.  
The alternative to these two portfolio hypotheses is the theoretical model of Berk and 
Green (2004), who argue that managers capture the wealth created by each portfolio in a 
competitive market. They assume that investors observe the skill of managers and place assets in 
portfolios until the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. The assumption that the asset flow 
is in response to manager skill implies that the contract between manager and client fully reveals 
the information of the manager. Under this hypothesis, we should observe no difference in 
performance across organizational forms. In other words, mutual funds should exhibit similar 
performance to hedge funds and institutional funds. 
2.4. Control variables 
With the exception Cici et al. (2010), the previous studies comparing performance across 
portfolio types do not control for differences that have an effect on performance but that are not 
related to portfolio type. We suggest that when these investment segments are all owned by the 
same company the effect of omitted variables is mitigated. Investment conglomerates and banks 
provide a variety of services that are centralized and tend to reduce differences in the segments 
unrelated to the contract, namely: partially or fully centralized information collection, a common 
resource base to pay for information, risk control over all managed portfolios, common reporting 
and monitoring to reduce the risk of fraud and “blowup” risk, and economies of scale in costs 
(legal cost, transactions costs). Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that the more expenditures on 
manager skill and information, the higher the return. Since these large financial organizations 
vary widely in their revenue, we introduce several control variables that proxy for the Grossman 
and Stiglitz effect. We include the assets under management by the fund and the conglomerate to 
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control for differences in size. In addition, we control for the concentration of the type of funds 
since the information and skill may have some economies of scope across fund type. Some 
conglomerates and investment banks have mostly mutual funds under management while others 
have concentrations of hedge funds and institutional funds. 
 Many hedge funds are younger and more active than mutual funds and institutional funds, 
yet this difference has nothing to do with being a hedge fund. Younger and more active mutual 
funds may have exactly the same risk-return characteristics. Transactions costs per share are 
probably lower for the more active and larger portfolios. Institutional portfolios are often much 
larger than hedge funds and mutual funds and may incur smaller transactions costs. We will use 
fees, revenues and age to control for these differences across portfolios that have nothing to do 
with the form of the contract. 
It is reasonable to expect that hedge funds would produce a superior risk-return 
relationship since hedge fund managers may invest in a wider variety of assets than mutual and 
institutional fund managers, and because incentive schemes differ across industries. Ackermann 
et al. (1999) find empirical evidence linking performance fees to improved hedge fund 
performance, but not to increased risk. We therefore control for the effect of fees on fund alphas 
in three ways. First all returns are measured net of fees. Second, as an explanatory variable we 
will include the fees of each fund. Finally, we will include the revenue of the conglomerate from 
portfolio management.  
Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) find decreasing returns to scale among hedge 
funds which Berk and Green (2004) suggest is related to investor experience with managers. 
Empirically, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) establish that management companies’ age is 
negatively related to their performance. Therefore age is an important control variable. 
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We will discuss the precise measurement of these variables in the next section after we describe 
the available data in the next section. 
3. Data collection and descriptive statistics 
We identified twenty-three investment banks that managed all three portfolio types during 
1990-2008. Our definition of an “investment bank” is that the organization had to engage in 
underwriting. All investment banks except Lehman and Nomura managed all three types 
simultaneously5. We matched the investment banks with investment organizations that reported 
returns, assets and other data for all three types of portfolios over this period. The organization 
had to report data on all three portfolio types simultaneously for at least twelve months. This 
resulted in forty eight investment organizations that we term “conglomerates”. Thus, our 
combined sample consists of 71 investment organizations (23 banks and 48 conglomerates) 
managing a total of 621 hedge funds, 2,679 institutional funds, and 2,865 mutual funds.6 The 
subsequent sections describe the sample construction process and descriptive statistics. The 
appendix lists the investment organizations and our classification for each as either an 
investment bank or a conglomerate.  
3.1. Databases  
The databases used in our sample are for hedge funds- TASS/Lipper, CISDM, Barclays 
Hedge Fund Data, Global Fund Analysis (for returns and fund descriptions), Mobius Hedge 
                                                 
5 Lehman stopped reporting on mutual funds in 1996 and started reporting hedge funds in 1997. Nomura 
stopped reporting mutual fund returns in 2001 and reported its first hedge fund in 2005. We treat Mercury asset 
management as an investment bank after its acquisition by Merrill Lynch in 1998. 
6 Sixty three of the organizations had all three types of portfolios simultaneously for three or more years. Note 
that our sample size never consists of all these funds in any given year.  
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Fund Panel Data7; for mutual funds- CRSP mutual fund database, Morningstar website, 
Morningstar CDs of various months; for institutional funds- we have obtained 58 quarterly 
surveys from June 1993 to December 2007 from the Mobius Group which reports returns and 
numerous other characteristics of institutional managers. Until 2007, Mobius was one of the 
primary vendors of money management data which were used by most large pension fund 
sponsors and endowment funds to determine who will manage their money. We cross-check the 
returns of the lowest return decile of managers with another commercially available database 
(Informa PSN) and a private source of return data8. In 2008, we added data from Informa PSN 
which acquired Mobius in 2006 and ended the product in 2007. We examine the returns and 
longevity of every money manager in these data who had full discretion over their accounts. To 
obtain addresses and legal company relationships we used SEC Edgar Filings, Thompson Fund 
Database, websites of investment conglomerates, Lexis-Nexis, Dow Jones, and general internet 
searches.  
All the databases include dead funds. However, the hedge fund databases drop funds 
from release to release. For CISDM we have annual releases 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009. For all 
funds in CISDM—not just those in our sample-- CISDM dropped 1.23% of funds by 2009 from 
one of the previous releases that we have. For Lipper/Tass, we have September 2005, February 
2008, March 2009 and July 2009. Lipper/Tass dropped 3.04% of its funds by July 2009 from one 
of the previous releases that we have. We hand-matched the hedge fund data from all releases of 
both Lipper/Tass and CISDM to get a complete hedge fund record for all 71 investment 
organizations. We have all releases of the institutional data from 1993 to 2008; we construct a 
                                                 
7 Funds that were in Mobius Hedge Fund and also in either TASS or CISDM reported identical returns. 
8 Ten managers were in Mobius and hired by the Virginia Retirement System. We had access to the internal 
records of the VRS from 1993 -1996. The data are identical to those in Mobius. 
 16 
survivorship bias free dataset of institutional returns. We use the 2009 CRSP Survivorship-bias 
free mutual fund database (reporting returns through January 2009) for all our mutual fund data. 
For security issuance data we used SDC and for lending data we used Dealscan. 
3.2 Matching funds with investment organizations 
There are no common identifiers across our databases. We hand-matched the investment 
organizations across mutual fund and hedge fund databases by name. While the CISDM database 
has a family name identifier, the TASS database does not. Therefore, we extract the family name 
from the title of the hedge fund. For the funds that did not have the family name in the title, we 
used Barclays Hedge Fund Data, Global Fund Analysis database, Lexis-Nexis, SEC filings, 
hedge fund web address, and general internet queries.  
   We then checked the address match between hedge funds and mutual funds. Several 
companies do not have a precise name match as their fund conglomerate mutual funds and hedge 
funds were offered by different subsidiaries. We require that the CRSP family names should be 
on record for at least two years with reported returns in one of those years. We then proceeded 
with a mechanical match. Within the mechanical match we use the first 12 letters from the CRSP 
family name to search the list of hedge fund names. We then match the investment organizations 
to institutional funds using our institutional fund database. The institutional database has a 
unique family name identifier and follows name changes for families. It also lists family legal 
addresses.  
3.3 Fund level filters and joining of assets classes  
Next, we apply the following filters to the initial dataset. We consider mutual and hedge 
funds that reported at least twelve monthly returns and institutional funds that reported at least 
eight quarterly returns. This eliminates 23 hedge funds, 220 institutional funds, and 77 mutual 
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funds but no conglomerates from our sample. For institutional funds, we take funds that reported 
net assets at least once eliminating a few newly created funds. For hedge funds, we eliminate 
funds that never reported asset values if other hedge funds in the same complex reported asset 
values.  Mutual funds with no assets are excluded because they most often are an additional 
share class to a fund that already reports share class assets. We eliminate funds that did not report 
fees. We also do not include money market or municipal bond funds in our sample (CRSP codes 
MF, MG, MQ, MS, MT, MY). These funds are mostly tax exempt and passively managed, and 
we have no similar funds in the hedge fund or institutional fund sector. This eliminates 530 funds 
(we find that about one percent of institutional portfolios are municipal portfolios and we 
exclude them from further analysis).  
We combine assets of mutual and hedge funds with multiple asset classes or return 
reports in multiple currencies. In combining the asset classes we use the following rules. We 
keep the longest return series. If two return series were of similar length we took class “A” or 
institutional shares to avoid the impact of a load return. If a particular asset class has assets that 
are significantly higher than all other return series, we keep the returns from the series with the 
highest assets. For mutual funds we join regular and institutional share class assets. If an 
institutional fund is the only asset class available and a fund with a similar name is reported by 
the institutional database as a “separate account“, we exclude this fund from the sample. 
Conversely, if an institutional database reports an institutional mutual fund, we exclude it from 
the institutional sample. This way the mutual fund industry contains both retail and institutional 
accounts. Sometimes the institutional database offers both equally and asset weighted returns. 
We choose equally weighted returns when available. If two asset classes report time series of the 
same length, but just one has turnover indicated, we took the latter. We choose “common” over 
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“investor”, and I over N asset classes. If a fund asset class with no load is offered we include it in 
the sample. Similarly, we prefer to keep USD denominated to other currency denominated hedge 
fund returns. If assets of multiple currency funds are equal across funds, we do not add the assets. 
We believe that in this case the total assets are already redundantly reported in all different share 
classes. We also preferred onshore to offshore funds. Again, we retained the longest return time 
series. We assume that the main difference between the onshore and offshore returns is the tax 
impact which is not the subject of our study. We keep funds from three industries that report 
returns for at least a year.  
3.4. Equity identifier  
Next, we identify equity mutual, hedge, and institutional funds. For equity mutual funds 
we modify the selection method used in Cici, Gibson, and Moussawia (2006). We mark funds 
that have an equity position between 50% and 105%, but belong to categories that are identified 
as equity.9 For the funds that do not report equity position, we mark them as “equity funds” if 
they belong to the following equity classes with ICDI objective code in CRSP: aggressive 
growth (AG), growth and income (GI), global equity funds (GE), international equity funds (IE), 
long term growth funds (LG), total return funds (TR), and sector funds (SF)10. Funds with 
missing entries are manually identified by examining the fund name. Among mutual funds, 1093 
are equity funds in our sample. We also exclude index funds from our sample as they represent a 
passive investment strategy. Since variables identifying index funds are available from 2003 only, 
we searched for “index” and “500” in names. In the institutional database, we defined 
international equity or domestic equity portfolios as equity. For hedge funds we examined the 
                                                 
9 In identifying funds’ equity percentage, or class membership, we take the last reported variable.  
10 Some sector funds include real estate funds. 
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styles reported in CISDM, TASS, or Mobius Hedge Fund Databases. If the styles suggested the 
use of equity, we defined the fund as an equity fund. For example, CISDM equity funds have the 
following styles: sector, relative value multi strategy, merger arbitrage, equity market neutral, 
equity long/short, while in Mobius the strategies are long/short equity, small/microcap, 
healthcare sector, long/short equity, and market neutral equity. We eliminated the “fund of fund” 
class of hedge funds to avoid double counting. Over the entire database, 52.6% of funds are 
equity funds; 48% of hedge funds are equity funds, 66% of institutional funds are equity funds 
and 52% of mutual funds are equity funds (see Table 1 and 2 for the year by year statistics). 
 3.5. Dealing with biases in the data 
Several studies have argued that hedge fund returns exhibit substantial serial correlation, 
where the main source of the correlation is the presence of illiquid assets in a portfolio manager 
performance measurement could be biased if one does not account for serial correlation. 
Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) show that the occurrence of positive alphas 
decreases in a sample after accounting for serial correlation. Lo (2002) shows that Sharpe ratios 
for auto-correlated returns could also be biased upwards. Several methods have been suggested 
for dealing with serial correlation. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), use a MA (2) process to 
correct for the smoothing bias. Jagannathan, et al. (2010) suggests that serial correlation is 
especially severe for hedge funds in specific sectors. We follow Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov 
(2004) and unsmooth all hedge fund returns with a MA (2) process using the following model:  
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system we impose the invariability constraint 1210 =++ θθθ . The economic meaning of this 
constraint is that the smoothing occurs over the most recent 2 periods.  
If itR  follows a MA (2) process, we can estimate 
i
tη  from (1) using maximum likelihood 
estimation. Getmansky et al. show that the concentrated likelihood function for equation (1) is:  
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To ensure invariability, we divide the estimated MA factors by 211 θθ ++ . This follows 
from a well-known statistical property of the MA process, where any non-invertible process can 
be transformed into an invertible process by adjusting the parameters and variance.  
We estimated a MA(2) process for all fund returns (hedge fund, mutual fund and 
institutional funds) that had at least 30 observations, unsmoothing those funds that exhibited at 
least a positive and significant first order autocorrelation. We find 180 out of 902 hedge funds 
yield significant positive 1θ  and 20 yield significant, positive 1θ  and 2θ . We unsmoothed 
returns for the 180 hedge funds by first unsmoothing the demeaned return and then adding back 
the mean. The average MA (2) parameters for the 180 hedge funds are as follows: 0θ is 0.744, 
1θ is 0.246, 2θ is 0.01, while average 1σ  is 0.093 and 2σ  is 0.094. This means that just 74.4% of 
returns from a current month are directly reflected in the reported return for these 180 funds. All 
other hedge fund studies report a larger percentage of funds that need to be unsmoothed. There 
are only a few mutual fund and institutional fund with significant MA (2) parameters and we 
chose not to unsmooth these funds since unsmoothing is not used by researchers using these data.  
Bollen and Pool (2009) find a significant discontinuity in the pooled distribution of 
reported hedge fund returns where the number of small gains far exceeds the number of small 
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losses. They find that the discontinuity is present in live funds, defunct funds, and funds of all 
ages, suggesting that it is not caused by database biases. The discontinuity is absent in the three 
months culminating in an audit, funds that invest in liquid assets, and hedge fund risk factors. 
This suggests that it is generated by return manipulation rather than by the skill of managers to 
avoid losses or by nonlinearities in hedge fund asset returns. We checked our hedge funds for 
this discontinuity and did not find any evidence of discontinuity.11  
Our finding that fewer of our hedge funds have significant MA (2) coefficients and that 
the discontinuity bias is not in our sample suggest that financial conglomerates and investment 
banks have reporting standards that are stricter than non-conglomerates. It suggests that the well 
documented reporting problems of hedge funds are mitigated when a large financial organization 
owns them. It clearly supports our research design of only comparing investment banks with 
other non-bank conglomerates. 
3.6. Back-fill bias 
Funds frequently bring all their history with them when joining the sample and can 
choose how much and what if any history to bring. This may bias conclusions about a manager’s 
superior performance in previous years. Ackerman, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Liang 
(2000), Fung and Hsieh (2000) have found evidence of backfill bias. Several databases identify 
the date that funds enter the sample. In this case the back-filled returns are deleted from the 
sample. Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) estimate the length of back-fill bias in the 
HFR database at between 12 months to 25 months. The difference in gain between 12 months 
and 25 months is material for our sample of hedge funds. Following Jagannathan, et al. (2010) 
                                                 
11 We thank Veronika Pool for examining our data for the discontinuity bias. 
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we chose to truncate all hedge fund and institutional fund return series by 12 returns. We did not 
adjust the mutual fund returns for back-fill bias, as is common by researchers. 12 
3.7. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 shows the assets under management, the number of portfolios and the size of the 
median portfolio, by year and by type of organizational form (“industry”). It is clear that the 
financial conglomerates and investment banks have very large assets under management. At their 
peak in 2007, they were managing almost $8 trillion with $5.9 trillion in equity portfolios. They 
are clearly the dominant force in mutual funds and institutional funds. In hedge funds, they do 
not manage nearly as much as non-conglomerates. The hedge fund industry had almost $1 
trillion under management in 2007 but conglomerates had only about 8% of the assets. The 
hedge fund industry has the reputation of being independent of large institutions and these 
numbers support this reputation.   
Table 2 shows the same variables as Table 1 but for only equity portfolios. The same 
general conclusions are shown in this table. Hedge fund portfolios are a fraction of the 
institutional and mutual fund portfolios. 
Table 3 Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the Sharpe ratios for all 621 hedge funds, 
2,679 institutional funds and 2,865 mutual funds. The average Sharpe ratio over this sample 
depends on the contract form. Hedge funds and institutional funds have positive Sharpe ratios 
                                                 
12 We tested for outliers in hedge fund returns by looking up returns that differ from the mean by more than 
eight standard deviations. We found four suspects. For example, “GAM Money Markets Fund (BP)” reported a 
return of 904.48% in 1/31/1993, the NAV increased tenfold in that month, while “GAM Money Markets Fund 
(DM)” reported a return of -94.11 in 12/31/1996, its assets decreased tenfold in that month. The other two outliers 
were around negative 30% return and were related to the 1987 market crash. As a result the identified occurrences 
were not marked as data errors. 
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while mutual funds have negative average Sharpe ratios. The hedge funds are the most volatile 
cross-sectionally while the mutual funds are the least volatile. Panel B shows the same statistics 
for the funds owned by investment banks. The statistics are very similar with the means being 
slightly higher. These tables show the same results for hedge funds and mutual funds as 
Ackerman, McEnally and Ravenscraft (1999) who conclude that hedge funds dominate mutual 
funds. We believe their data does not control for omitted variables and the possibility that Sharpe 
ratios can be manipulated by hedge funds13. Consequently, we will follow the lead of recent 
researchers who have focused on alphas from return generating models. In the next section we 
will describe the methodology to test our hypothesis. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Risk adjusted return 
To compare the risk and return relationship across industries we use a multifactor model 
and check it for robustness. Following Fung, W. and Hsieh, D. (2001) we use seven factors. The 
seven factors are: Excess return on the value weighted market (Rm- Rf), size (SMB), value 
(HML), Carhart’s (1997) momentum factor (PR1YR), Lehman High Yield Index (MLHYB), 
Salomon World Government Bond Index (MLGG), and the Standard and Poor’s Commodity 
Index (SPGSCI)14. We estimate one, four, six, and seven factor versions of the model. For 
portfolio p the four models are: 
                                                 
13 See Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2007). However, the findings that the Bollen and Pool show 
nothing suggest that the manipulation is less when funds are owned by large organizations. 
14 The market factor is the CRSP value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. The risk 
free rate is the one-month Treasury bill rate from Ibbotson Associates. The SMB, HML, PR1YR are from Fama and 
French data library. The Lehman High Yield Index is proxied by “Merrill Lynch high yield bond C” index, and 
Salomon World Government Bond Index is proxied by “Merrill Lynch Global Governments” index, while 
commodity factor is proxied by SPGS Commodity Index. 
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One factor model 
Rpt – Rft = αp + βp1(Rmt-Rft) + εpt. (3) 
Four factor model 
Rpt – Rft = αp + βp1(Rmt-Rft) + βp2SMBt + βp3HMLt + βp4PR1YRt + εpt. (4) 
Six factor model 
Rpt – Rft = αp + βp1(Rmt-Rft) + βp2SMBt + βp3HMLt + βp4PR1YRt + βp5(MLHYB-Rft) + 
βp6(MLGG-Rft) + εpt. (5) 
Seven factor model 
Rpt – Rft = αp + βp1(Rmt-Rft) + βp2SMBt + βp3HMLt + βp4PR1YRt + βp5(MLHYB-Rft) + 
βp6(MLGG-Rft) + βp7(SPGSCI-Rft) + εpt. (6) 
To account for non-stationarity, we use a time-varying regression technique called 
“flexible regression” (FLS) developed by Kalaba and Tesfatsion (1989) and Lutkepohl and 
Herwartz (1996) that avoids these problems. In the terminology of Lutkepohl and Herwartz 
(1996) we use the “standard form” of the model which assumes that the regression coefficient 
vector, bt, evolves continuously over time in the linear model tttt xy εβ +′=  where tx is the K × 
1 vector of values of the independent variable at time t and εt is the error term with E[εt] = cov(εt, 
εt-j) = 0, and var(εt) = σ2. There are two sources of error: measurement error is the (usual) 
difference between the dependent variable at time t, yt, and its predicted value defined as: 
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To estimate the model they minimize a weighted sum, γsse + (1 - γ)ssd, where the user 
supplies the weight γ ∈ (0, 1). Kalaba and Tesfatsion prove that the collection of all possible 
weighted sums attainable at time N, {sse, ssd |β, N}, is contained by a lower envelope that is 
bounded away from the origin. If time variation in betas exists, there is an optimal combination 
of the two errors that will minimize the variation below the standard OLS solution. Nevertheless, 
Lutkepohl and Herwartz (1996) demonstrate that the model will find variation in betas when the 
true betas are constant since specifying the second error term forces periodicity on to constant 
betas. Thus, if there are no a priori reasons to believe that coefficients vary, the technique may 
reduce the explanatory power of a regression model. However, there is no shortage of studies 
showing that mutual fund betas and alphas are time-varying.15 Lutkepohl and Herwartz (1996) 
show that if the betas are periodic, the second error term will capture it well even if the 
periodicity is combined with a discontinuous shift.  
We weight the two sources of error unequally and set γ = 0.95. Our purpose is to estimate 
the time-varying regression coefficients over time in a manner that imposes the minimum 
                                                 
15 For example, see Ferson and Khang (2002) for one of many papers proposing a solution for time-variation 
that involves asymptotic distributions. We have many portfolios with relatively short time series and could not use 
asymptotic techniques without a significant loss of observations in the cross-sectional results below.  
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variation attributed to time-varying styles and betas. Our assumption is that styles and betas 
change slowly over time.16 For robustness, we reproduce all results with OLS.  
Figure 1 shows the time variation in flexible alphas over the 19 years in the sample. The 
alphas are averaged cross-sectionally for each industry and weighted by assets under 
management. For example, in 2000 there were 178 hedge funds that produced alphas. The 
flexible regression model produces an alpha monthly for each fund. We use the end of year 
assets under management for each fund to value weight the alphas for all 178 hedge funds in 
2000. The graphs are constructed from these averages for hedge funds, mutual funds and 
institutional funds. The average hedge fund alpha is positive while the mutual fund and 
institutional fund averages are negative; all are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Clearly the asset weighted hedge fund alphas are much more volatile than the mutual fund and 
institutional fund alphas which have lower standard deviations. Before 1996, the hedge fund 
alphas are the highest. This corresponds to a period early in the sample when the hedge fund 
industry was rapidly expanding. After 1996, the hedge fund, mutual fund and institutional fund 
alphas tend to move together. Based on this graph, it seems that the hedge fund organizational 
form gives higher abnormal returns although the abnormal returns are more volatile. However, 
there are differences in the funds which are not captured by organizational form. Consequently, 
we will use control variables to adjust the results.  
4.2 Measuring the effect of organizational form and ownership 
To test the hypothesis that investment banks provide advantages to assets under 
management, we run cross-sectional regressions explaining cross-sectional differences in alpha. 
                                                 
16 Flexible regression is not a random coefficient model. Kalaba and Tesfatsion (1989) argue that random 
coefficients are explicitly excluded from the development of the model. However, Lutkepohl (1993) shows that the 
solution algorithm may be interpreted as the coefficient values that maximize the conditional density 
g(β1,..βT|y1,…,yT) assuming that g(β1) is a constant. 
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We use a dummy variable for investment bank. As a proxy for the differences in profit margins 
across portfolios, we use the dispersion of fees. As discussed in the Hypothesis section (2.3), the 
empirical and theoretical literature predicts a positive coefficient on this dummy variable.  
Control variables are selected to control for differences in the organizations that have nothing 
to do with being an investment bank but potentially allow an organization to generate higher risk 
adjusted returns. Summarizing the discussion in section II above, we think of these differences as 
differences in the ability to pay for information and in portfolio management skills. A 
conglomerate with many assets under management may be able to pay more for information (or 
skills) than a conglomerate with fewer assets under management. Similarly, a large fund may 
have an advantage over a small fund or a fund with more experience may have advantages over 
funds with less experience. The literature reviewed in section II has found fees, assets under 
management and age, both at the fund level and conglomerate level, as statistically significant 
factors in explaining performance. Our specific control variables are: 
1. Dummy variables for fund type: dHF denotes a hedge fund, dMF a mutual fund and dIN 
an institutional fund; we also use a dummy variable if the fund is an equity fund. 
2. Fee: computed as the fee per dollar of assets under management charged by the fund in 
year t. For institutional funds fees are estimated from the fee schedule based on the 
median account size; for mutual funds we use expense ratios, or management fees if 
expense ratios are not available; for hedge funds we use the management fee.  
3. Ln(Revenue): this is the natural log of Max Fee multiplied by assets under management 
for the fund. MaxFee is the same as Fee for Institutional and Mutual funds. For hedge 
funds we add any performance fees subject to approximated watermark adjustment.17 
                                                 
17 The mean (std. deviation) of FEE is 0.94 (0.57) while MAXFee is 1.13 (1.31). There is no material difference 
in the results using one or the other.  
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4. Ln(Age): this is the natural log of the age of the fund.  
5. Ln(Aum): this is the natural log of assets under management for the fund 
6. Ln(Aum Org): this is the natural log of all assets under management by the conglomerate 
including all hedge fund, mutual fund and institutional assets, for both passive and active 
funds.  
7. Industry Concentration: this is number of portfolios by the fund-type (institutional, hedge 
funds or mutual fund) divided by number of all portfolios under management in the firm. 
5. Results 
5.1 Baseline model 
 Table 4 shows the cross-sectional regression of alphas on dummy variables for industry, 
fund type, the control variables and whether the fund is owned by an investment bank. The first 
line is the result of a pooled cross-sectional regression with all 53,304 fund-years in the 
regression. The robust standard errors are clustered by conglomerate. Coefficients in bold are 
significant with p values of 5%; bold and italics indicate a p value of 1%.  
 The coefficient for the investment banking dummy variable is a statistically significant 
negative -0.0385 which means that being owned by an investment bank reduces the alpha of a 
fund by 3.85 basis points per month or about 46 basis points (0.0046) per year. This is in sharp 
contrast with the finance literature. Figure 2 shows how the coefficient changes over time. The 
upper and lower lines are the 95% confidence intervals. Estimating the coefficient on an annual 
basis produces only three coefficients where zero is not in the confidence bound (1990, 1991, 
and 1996) and 1993, 1994, and 2003 show positive insignificant coefficients18. But most are 
                                                 
18 The coefficient for the investment banking dummy variable in 1997 is negative and significant at 10%. 
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negative. Using this graph and the actual assets under active management by investment banks, 
we get a total economic loss of $127.978 billion or about $6.7 billion per year. Therefore, the 
benefits of investment bank asset management outweighed conflicts of interest only for five 
years of our 19 year sample. Investment bank asset management added value for only short 
periods. Consequently, our baseline investment banking hypothesis that being owned by an 
investment bank adds value to portfolios under management over being owned by a non-bank 
financial conglomerate does not appear to hold in general. We conclude that being owned by an 
investment bank statistically and economically reduces the return of a portfolio.  
 Table 4 shows that for the pooled data over 19 years there is no advantage for any 
portfolio type. The apparent advantage for hedge funds in Figure 2 disappears when control 
variables are added to the cross sectional results. This confirms the Berk-Green hypothesis that 
the market is competitive enough to control agency costs among fund type. Consequently, we 
reject our two portfolio hypotheses: the management alignment hypothesis and the flexibility 
hypothesis. In other words, returns are not higher, the greater the alignment between 
management and clients or the fewer the restrictions placed on the manager. 
 The bottom three lines of Table 4 shows the base results by confining the regression to 
one type of portfolio. The investment banking dummy variable is significant for only mutual 
funds suggesting that these portfolios are the source of the economic rents. Moreover, the 
coefficient on the control variable FEE is significant only for mutual funds suggesting that 
differences in fees explain how the investment banks extract money from the portfolios. Massa 
and Rehman (2008) found that mutual fund holdings of companies that receive loans from banks 
show a positive gross return. Table 4 shows that this return does not flow to investors in mutual 
funds. 
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 It is instructive that the control variables are only significant for the hedge fund and 
mutual fund subsample. This suggests that the 71 conglomerates and banks are optimized for 
institutional clients. The differences of the control variables do not matter for institutional fund 
alphas. In fact, the equation has no explanatory power at all. In contrast, different control 
variables matter between hedge fund and mutual funds. The revenue, age and assets under 
management, are statistically significant for hedge fund alphas. This suggests that information 
and risk control, which are size-related, are critical for hedge funds. In contrast, the fee variable 
and equity dummy variable is statistically significant for mutual funds, e.g., fees - possibly 
reflecting distribution expenses - are important for mutual fund alphas.  
 The baseline result in Table 4 is partially dependent on the measurement model for alphas. 
We estimate alphas alternatively using from one to seven factors and with both flexible 
regressions and OLS estimated both with all the available data for each portfolio and OLS 
applied to a rolling thirty-six month sample for each portfolio (assuming there is at least 36 
months available). In results that are available from the authors, the coefficient on investment 
banking depends on whether the estimation of alpha allows for time variation. The estimation 
method however does not matter. Regardless of whether we employ flexible least squares or 
“rolling windows” of 36 returns we get similar results for a four to seven factor model with 
investment banking coefficients between -0.0317 (Rolling windows with four factor) to -0.0496 
(FLS with six factor model).  
5.2. Conflict of interest and information variables 
Tables 4 and the robustness tests provide strong evidence that being owned by an 
investment bank is economically and statistically significant with the loss appearing to be borne 
primarily by mutual funds. We further examine two questions. First, the evidence so far shows 
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the significance of a dummy variable representing investment bank ownership. Since intercepts 
are the “residual claimant” on problems with a regression equation, we may be capturing the 
effect of an omitted factor with the dummy variable that only shifts the intercept. The R-squared 
coefficients shown in Table 4 are statistically significant but quite low. Second, the tables do not 
show how the investment banks extract value from assets. As we discussed above, the finance 
literature provides some guidance on the second question. First, Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro 
(2007) predict that conflicts of interest will be less for a multiproduct firm when profit margins 
on the product lines are equal. While we cannot accurately measure the profit margins on every 
product line for every firm, we can compute the cross-sectional dispersion of fees under the 
assumption that the costs are roughly the same across funds. This proxy variable allows us to 
compare investment banks with non-bank firms. Given the theoretical results, we expect this 
variable to have a negative sign. The greater the dispersion, the more scope for conflicts of 
interest.  
Second, we have discussed the evidence that the loan and issuance activities of 
investment banks provide valuable information in managing mutual funds found in Ritter and 
Zhang (2007) and Massa and Rehman (2008). This suggests that variables measuring the lending 
and underwriting business of investment banks should reduce or eliminate the effect shown in 
Table 4. From the Dealscan database, we collect the dollar amount of the loans made in each 
year for each bank along with the number of loans the bank made and the number of lead loans 
the bank made. From the SDC database we collect the issue fees, proceeds, market share and 
number of issues for new and seasoned equity and bond issues in each year for each investment 
bank. The larger these variables, the larger the business activity of the investment bank and 
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presumably the more information the bank has available for portfolio managers. This suggests a 
positive sign on these variables.  
Table 5 shows the cross-sectional results, using robust standard errors clustered at the 
conglomerate level, from adding the cross-sectional fee dispersion and the percentage of lead 
loans variables to the base results of Table 4. Both variables are significant with the correct sign 
for investment banks. As predicted the coefficient on the lead-loan variable is significant and 
positive which is consistent with the empirical finance literature. As predicted by the Bolton et al. 
theoretical model, the fee dispersion variable is significant only for investment banks in both the 
pooled sample and the sub-samples by portfolio type. The incentives for conflicts of interest 
increase when the investment banking firm has different profit margins across its products. The 
investment banking dummy variable is now insignificant indicating that the two variables 
suggested by the finance literature, fee dispersion and lead loans, entirely captures the negative 
effect of being owned by an investment bank. When the data are segmented by type, the 
investment bank dichotomous variable is never significant and fee dispersion of investment 
banks is significant for the institutional funds. This suggests that the pooled result is driven by 
the differences in fund type.  
If either of the variables is omitted, as in the first four rows of the table, the coefficient on 
the investment banking dummy variable is significant and negative. In these first four rows, 
when the data are split by portfolio type, the investment banking coefficient is significant only 
for the mutual fund sub-sample and only when fee dispersion is omitted. This confirms the 
finding of Table 4 and suggests that the fees on mutual funds offset the advantage for the clients 
of portfolios from the information gained by lending. When fee dispersion is included in the 
regression, the investment banking dummy variable is not significant suggesting that the fee 
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dispersion generating the conflict of interest occurs in the mutual fund portfolios rather than in 
the institutional and hedge fund. However, the institutional subsample has a significant fee 
dispersion coefficient which suggests that conflicts of interests play a role in the pricing of these 
portfolios. It is clear from this table that for this variable to fully capture differences in alpha, the 
full range of products needs to be included in the regression.  
 In contrast, Table 5 again shows that these organizations are optimized more for 
institutional clients than for clients in hedge funds and mutual funds since the control variables 
are not significant for the institutional fund sub-sample. In fact the only significant variables are 
fee dispersion and lead loan lending. Surprisingly the effect of any lead loan activity is negative. 
It is only the investment banks that use the information to help their portfolios. Evidently the 
non-banks, subtract value from their portfolios to lead loan syndicates. Moreover, the non-bank 
lead loans primarily affect the institutional funds.  
 In unreported work available from the authors, the underwriting variables of proceeds 
and fees from issuing debt and equity for each investment bank are insignificant suggesting that 
it is the lending activities that give investment banks an advantage in managing funds.19 We also 
constructed portfolios by averaging the fund alphas for a conglomerate or investment banks and 
by portfolio type. Our results are similar to Table 5 for the effect of investment banks.20 
                                                 
19We use of number of lead loans versus the dollar amount of lead loans because the data limits our ability to 
observe the dollars invested in a loan by the conglomerate. We only observe the total loan size, in which a 
conglomerate is often one of many lenders. A conglomerate will likely have a policy where it participates in a loan 
to X percent dollars [Ivashina and Scarfstein (2010) suggest on average X = 30% but that it is volatile]. We think the 
number of lead loans is a better proxy for investment banking involvement in loans than the dollar amount since the 
dollar amount can be distorted by a few large loans. The number or percentage number is always significant; the log 
of the dollar amount is not.  
20 However, the equally-weighted average hedge fund out performs the average institutional fund which in turn 
outperforms the average mutual fund. This does not reject the Berk and Green (2004) hypothesis. They argue that 
assets will flow in response to better performing funds and their theory is supported by the fact that equally weighted 
fund alphas show a difference while value- weighted do not. 
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 Table 6 shows the estimation of the equation of Table 5 with the investment banking 
variables year by year for the pooled results and the economic loss or benefit from being owned 
by an investment bank using the dummy variable, the conflict of interest variable (fee dispersion) 
and the information variable (percent lead loans). The pattern of the dummy variables, and their 
magnitude, are similar to Figure 2, which shows the variation over time. The economic losses or 
benefits correspondingly vary over time. There are five years in the sample when being owned 
by an investment bank is beneficial (1993, 1994, 2001, 2002 and 2003) and fourteen years where 
being owned by a bank is harmful. Ignoring present value, the total loss is $93.43 billion, which 
is about $4.9 billion per year. The information variable gives a smaller loss than calculated from 
Table 4 but we conclude that it is economically and statistically significant.21 
6. Conclusions 
This study compares the investment performance of three types of delegated portfolios - 
mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds - when they are owned by investment banks 
versus being owned by non-bank financial services groups. Our sample consists of all financial 
groups, both investment banks and non-banks (which we call conglomerates), which managed a 
mutual fund, hedge fund and institutional fund at the same time for at least one year during 1990-
2008. We have twenty three investment banks and forty eight non-investment banks. We 
examine the impact of investment banks and investor contract form on the alphas of all portfolios 
that these financial groups operated during the time period. We compare investment banks only 
with other financial groups to control the effect of omitted variables. Comparing investment bank 
                                                 
21 Using both the levels of the variables and the slope dummy produces regressions in some years with very high condition 
indexes. The condition index for the pooled equation in the fourth row of table 5 is 36.7 but using only 2003 data the condition 
index is 68.6 and remains above 40 in the years after. The condition index for the estimation of the economic loss in table 6 never 
is above 40. Furthermore, this equation gives us the lowest economic harm of being owned by an investment bank. 
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operated portfolios to portfolios not in a financial group is likely to increase the effect of omitted 
variables. Comprehensive investment organizations centralize the cash flows from fees allowing 
these organizations to centralize trading and information gathering, and to spread legal costs, 
monitoring costs, and the costs of client relationships across portfolio type.  
     To examine the risk-return differences, we estimate alphas on unsmoothed returns using the 
moving average process developed by Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) accounting for 
differences in portfolio exposure to various risk factors by using a seven factor model with time-
varying alphas. We test the hypothesis that investment banks produce different alphas relative to 
non-bank conglomerates by examining the cross-sectional regression of fund alphas on control 
variables and type of organization.  
We find that the form of the contract offered to investors is not a statistically significant 
control variable. It appears that competition equalizes the impact of the three contract forms 
across time. We reject the hypotheses that some contracts better align incentives, that investment 
flexibility leads to better returns and that those organizations with more money to spend on 
manager skill and information produce better returns. Our evidence is consistent with Berk and 
Green’s (2004) hypothesis that investment organizations return a single competitive return to 
investors. 
We find that the organizations are optimized for institutional funds and that control 
variables are critically important to examine hedge funds and mutual funds. We find that 
ownership matters. On average investors experience a lower alpha by 46 basis points a year 
when a fund is operated by an investment bank versus being owned by a non-bank conglomerate, 
regardless of fund type. Consistent with the finance literature, the investment banks that 
participate more in lead loans add more value to their assets under management. Consistent with 
 36 
recent theory those with more disperse fees subtract more value. The effect of investment bank 
ownership is material amounting to at least a $4.9 billion loss per year over the 19 year sample 
but the dollar loss is time-varying. In 1993-1994 and 2001-2003, the average investment banks 
added value to their funds. Investment banks subtract value during 1990-1992, 1995-2000 and 
2004-2008. Finally, it appears that the mutual fund portfolios experience much of the economic 
loss.  
Our study raises the question of why investment banks are able to extract economic rents this 
large over this many years. A partial answer to this question may be in the time variation of the 
rents. Perhaps five years of adding value conditioned investors enough to hold off the 
competition from non-bank conglomerates in the fourteen years the investment banks subtracted 
value. The ability to do so suggests that bank competition in fund management is an important 
area for future research.  
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Table 1 
Assets for all portfolios 
This table presents the asset time series for the funds managed by twenty-three investment banks and forty-eight conglomerates. Assets under 
active management at the end of the year are reported in millions of dollars. There are 621 unique hedge funds, 2,679 unique institutional 
funds, and 2,865 unique mutual funds.  
 
Hedge Funds 
 
Institutional Funds 
 
Mutual Funds 
 Year N Median Total HF   N Median Total IN   N Median Total MF Total 
2008 240 105   63,375    1,368 745 4,298,597   1,630 206 1,395,156 5,757,128  
2007 318 108   80,165    1,484 1,129 5,936,064   1,715 232 1,653,433 7,669,662  
2006 316 83   66,223    1,607 986 5,686,343   1,790 204 1,436,643 7,189,209  
2005 291 74   53,634    1,720 831 5,072,762   1,706 192 1,181,860 6,308,256  
2004 278 65   45,310    1,781 708 4,472,861   1,661 172 977,769 5,495,941  
2003 251 57   36,014    1,809 639 4,006,336   1,696 133 775,238 4,817,588  
2002 219 54   30,197    1,795 521 3,365,344   1,730 115 759,703 4,155,243  
2001 211 54   28,716    1,726 618 3,523,594   1,693 117 869,948 4,422,258  
2000 178 51   26,680    1,600 603 3,173,526   1,623 112 993,443 4,193,648  
1999 163 43   21,931    1,510 628 3,318,704   1,447 104 802,399 4,143,035  
1998 148 43   20,294    1,436 576 3,049,936   1,233 86 666,012 3,736,242  
1997 137 39   17,795    1,335 561 2,597,330   1,085 94 555,362 3,170,487  
1996 124 34   12,533    1,227 533 2,130,769   941 82 425,958 2,569,260  
1995 106 38    9,604    1,085 514 1,713,594   817 90 330,433 2,053,630  
1994 83 42    8,947    956 453 1,300,139   739 86 280,847 1,589,933  
1993 69 40    6,501    827 453 1,106,004   609 93 229,539 1,342,044  
1992 57 31    4,371    562 333 624,466   499 87 173,939 802,777  
1991 50 30    3,685    493 326 531,296   364 89 121,568 656,549  
1990 46 31    3,477    415 296 407,649   305 95 100,122 511,247  
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Table 2 
Assets for equity portfolios 
This table presents the asset time series for the equity funds managed by twenty-three investment banks and forty-eight conglomerates. Assets 
under active management at the end of the year are reported in millions of dollars. There are 374 unique equity hedge funds, 1,840 unique equity 
institutional funds and 2,248 unique mutual funds. 
 
Hedge Funds 
 
Institutional Funds 
 
Mutual Funds 
 Year N Median Total HF   N Median Total IN   N Median Total MF Total 
2008 159 106   37,436    983 590 2,100,701   1,321 215 1,156,042 3,294,179  
2007 204 111   45,029    1,065 894 3,748,033   1,384 264 1,405,083 5,198,146  
2006 192 84   35,323    1,158 844 3,638,304   1,441 218 1,228,226 4,901,854  
2005 180 72   28,555    1,210 699 3,145,100   1,369 197 995,131 4,168,787  
2004 176 65   23,383    1,252 611 2,773,984   1,329 172 806,799 3,604,166  
2003 172 54   20,910    1,276 517 2,482,777   1,365 128 622,981 3,126,669  
2002 149 53   18,208    1,261 399 1,776,371   1,395 110 633,663 2,428,242  
2001 129 59   17,279    1,201 509 1,980,567   1,373 119 756,811 2,754,657  
2000 104 54   17,336    1,102 565 2,035,529   1,301 119 891,111 2,943,976  
1999 89 54   12,845    1,032 614 2,145,132   1,139 107 697,737 2,855,714  
1998 77 51   10,437    959 529 1,836,119   943 97 564,090 2,410,646  
1997 76 44    9,115    873 550 1,570,765   828 101 470,577 2,050,458  
1996 67 43    7,532    788 531 1,286,135   698 102 357,670 1,651,337  
1995 61 43    5,617    683 496 983,315   602 104 272,041 1,260,974  
1994 47 54    4,720    597 424 744,405   552 93 227,545 976,669  
1993 41 54    3,792    520 401 637,140   463 100 181,805 822,736  
1992 35 51    2,881    359 265 353,926   378 87 135,241 492,047  
1991 31 51    2,606    310 259 296,188   277 94 96,166 394,960  
1990 28 52    2,462    257 249 211,735   235 99 81,505 295,703  
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Table 3 
Sharpe ratios of actively managed funds 
These summary statistics are for the Sharpe ratios for all active funds in the investment bank and conglomerate sample in Panel A and the investment 
banks in Panel B. We drop the first 12 return observations from hedge funds older than 24 months to control for backfill bias. We use mutual funds and 
institutional funds with at least 12 observations. Our institutional and mutual fund samples are free from backfill bias. We considered monthly returns 
from January 1990 to December 2008. The one month T-bill rate is from Ibbotson Associates. All returns are net of fees. The Sharpe ratio is calculated 
for each portfolio from the complete return series that are not backfilled.  
Panel A: All Investment Banks and Conglomerates 1990-2008 
  Hedge Funds Institutional Funds Mutual Funds  
N 621 2,679 2,865   
Mean 0.076 0.101 -0.010   
Median 0.074 0.097 0.019   
Min -1.000 -2.500 -1.800   
Max 2.190 5.300 2.130   
St Dev. 0.300 0.245 0.189   
Kurtosis 8.620 162.000 10.800   
Skewness 1.590 7.550 -0.300   
          
Panel B: Investment Banks 1990-2008 
  Hedge Funds Institutional Funds Mutual Funds   
N 219 1,182 1,456   
Mean 0.109 0.106 -0.010   
Median 0.085 0.094 0.009   
Min -1.000 -0.720 -1.800   
Max 2.190 5.240 2.130   
St Dev. 0.359 0.258 0.201   
Kurtosis 10.100 150.000 14.800   
Skewness 2.020 8.340 -0.120   
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Figure 1 
Seven factor flexible regression alphas over time 
 
  
 
                      
                        
                        
                        
                        
                HF IN MF   
              Average Alpha 0.0126 -0.0522 -0.1256   
              Standard Deviation (0.2138) (0.0992) (0.1385)   
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
                        
This figure presents the value weighted cross-sectional average alpha from a seven factor time-varying flexible least squares model. End of year assets are used to weight the alpha in each month for 
each fund. The inset represents simple average and standard deviation from the resulting series. The statistic is calculated separately for hedge funds (HF), institutional funds (IN) and mutual funds 
(MF). The sample includes all active funds for all twenty-three investment banks and all forty-eight conglomerates. 
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Table 4 
Baseline results 
For each fund we compute time-varying alphas with a seven factor model estimated with a time-varying parameter model. For each fund we obtain an alpha for each month and average the alpha over the months in 
each year or part of year. We estimate this alpha for all funds owned by the conglomerate or investment bank excluding fund of funds, index funds, money market funds, and municipal bond funds. We regress the 
seven factor alphas on dummy variables for investment banks (Investment Bank), institutional funds (dIN), hedge funds (dHF), mutual funds (dMF), equity funds (dEquity), and continuous variables: fees charged 
(Fee), the natural log of fees times assets under management [Ln(Revenue)], the natural log of age of fund [Ln(Age)], the natural log of assets under management [Ln(Aum)], the natural log of assets under 
management for organization[Ln(Aum Org)], the number of portfolios of the fund type (institutional, hedge fund or mutual fund) divided by the number of portfolios of all funds under management by the firm 
(Industry Concentration). Regressions are estimated with the restriction: dIN+dHF+dMF=0. “*” indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level; “**” indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; 
“***” indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are clustered by investment bank or conglomerate and estimated with robust estimators. The rows labeled "Hedge Funds", "Mutual 
Funds" and "Institutional Funds" restrict the sample to only those funds. 
 
  Investment Bank dIN dHF dMF dEquity Fee Ln(Revenue) Ln(Age) Ln(Aum) Ln(Aum Org) 
Industry 
Concentration Constant R
2 N 
Pooled -0.0385** -0.0109 0.0403 -0.0294 -0.0424** -0.1286*** 0.0287** 0.0097 -0.0063 -0.0015 0.0027 0.0159 0.0156 51,304 
Hedge Funds  0.0076       -0.1634* -0.0919 0.3655*** 0.1135** -0.2134*** -0.0097 -0.1332 0.1818 0.0363 3,285 
Mutual Funds -0.0705***       -0.0529*** -0.1690*** 0.0260 0.0026 0.0101 -0.0117 0.0245 0.1205 0.0316 23,283 
Institutional Funds -0.0079       -0.0378 -0.0195 -0.0122 -0.0016 0.0029 0.0131 -0.0058 -0.1830 0.0022 24,736 
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Figure 2  
Coefficient on investment banking dummy variable over time 
This figure presents the 95% confidence interval around the estimated investment banking coefficient (Investment Bank) from the base result regressions in Table 4 with the regressions run year by year. 
For each fund we compute time-varying alphas with a seven factor model estimated with a time-varying parameter model. For each fund we obtain an alpha for each month and average the alpha over 
the months in each year or part of year. We estimate this alpha for all funds owned by the conglomerate or investment bank excluding fund of funds, index funds, money market funds, and municipal 
bond funds. We regress the seven factor alphas on dummy variables for investment banks (Investment Bank), institutional funds (dIN), hedge funds (dHF), mutual funds (dMF), equity funds (dEquity), 
and continuous variables: fees charged (Fee), the natural log of fees times assets under management [Ln(Revenue)], the natural log of age of fund [Ln(Age)], the natural log of assets under management 
[Ln(AUM)], the natural log of assets under management for an organization [Ln(Aum Org)], the number of portfolios of the fund type (institutional, hedge fund or mutual fund) divided by the number 
of portfolios of all funds under management by the firm (Industry Concentration). Regressions are estimated with the restriction: dIN+dHF+dMF=0.     
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Table 5 
Cross-sectional regression with conflicts of interest and information variables   
For each fund we compute time-varying alphas with a seven factor model estimated with a time-varying parameter model. For each fund we obtain an alpha for each month and average the alphas over the months in each 
year. We estimate this alpha for all funds owned by the conglomerate or investment bank excluding fund of funds, index funds, money market funds, and municipal bond funds. We regress the seven factor alphas on dummy 
variables for investment banks (Investment Bank), institutional funds (dIN), hedge funds (dHF), mutual funds (dMF), equity funds (dEquity), and continuous variables: fees charged (Fee), the natural log of fees times assets 
under management [Ln(Revenue)], the natural log of age of fund [Ln(Age)], the natural log of assets under management [Ln(Aum)], the natural log of assets under management for an organization [Ln(Aum Org)], the 
number of portfolios of the fund type (institutional, hedge fund, or mutual fund) divided by the number of portfolios of all funds under management by the firm (Industry Concentration), the cross sectional dispersion of fees 
across all portfolios in a year for a firm (Fee Dispersion), and the percentage of number lead loans in a year that the organization originated (% Nr Lead Loans). Interaction variables are the investment banking dummy 
variable times the fee dispersion (Fee Dispersion * dIB) and the investment banking dummy variable times the percentage number of lead loans (% Nr Lead Loans * dIB). Regressions are estimated with the restriction: 
dIN+dHF+dMF=0. “*” indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level; “**” indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; “***” indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are 
clustered by investment bank or conglomerate and estimated with robust estimators. The rows labeled "Hedge Funds", "Mutual Funds" and "Institutional Funds" restrict the sample to only those funds. 
 
  Investment  Bank dIN dHF dMF dEquity Fee Ln (Revenue) Ln(Age) Ln(Aum) Ln(Aum Org) 
Industry 
Concen-
tration 
Fee  
Dispersion 
Fee Dispersion 
*dIB 
% Nr Lead 
Loans 
% Nr Lead 
Loans*dIB 
 
Constant 
 
R2 N 
Pooled -0.0977*** -0.0106 0.0428 -0.0322* -0.0444** -0.1263*** 0.0281** 0.0082 -0.0057 -0.005 0.0097     -0.2709** 0.4673*** 0.0642 0.018 51,304 
Hedge Funds  -0.0792       -0.1538 -0.1107 0.3738*** 0.1266** -0.2190*** -0.0076 -0.0376      0.3167 0.1809 0.1097 0.039 3,285 
Mutual Funds -0.1494***       -0.0556*** -0.1664*** 0.0286 0.0002 0.0093 -0.0172* 0.0213     -0.2513* 0.5164*** 0.2 0.035 23,283 
Institutional Funds -0.0538       -0.0387 -0.0191 -0.0156 -0.0035 0.0052 0.0116 0.0072     -0.3718*** 0.5002*** -0.1606 0.006 24,736 
                                      
Pooled  0.0414 -0.0114 0.0416 -0.0303* -0.0455** -0.1294*** 0.0289** 0.0096 -0.0064 -0.0068 0.0036 0.1190* -0.2712** -0.2553** 0.4467*** 0.0239 0.019 51,281 
Hedge Funds  -0.0367       -0.1533 -0.107 0.3729*** 0.1314** -0.2193*** -0.0065 -0.0016 -0.043 -0.0856  0.318 0.1651 0.0941 0.04 3,283 
Mutual Funds -0.1108       -0.0538*** -0.1737*** 0.0269 0.0009 0.0099 -0.0167* 0.0102 0.1054 -0.0653 -0.2364 0.5000*** 0.1473 0.036 23,272 
Institutional Funds  0.1252       -0.0417 -0.0247 -0.0117 -0.0028 0.0026 0.0078 -0.0417 0.102 -0.3821** -0.3551*** 0.4973*** -0.1346 0.007 24,726 
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Table 6 
Economic loss from investment banking ownership of a delegated portfolio  
This table reports the dollar loss based on year by year regressions. The economic loss is computed by taking the coefficients for the investment banking dummy variable (Investment Bank), the interaction of fee dispersion 
with investment banks dummy (Fee Dispersion * dIB) and the interaction of percent number of Lead Loans with the investment bank dummy variable (% Nr Lead Loans * dIB) all in year t, then using the value of that variable 
for each investment bank in year t to get the percentage harm. The dollar harm or benefit in year t is the percentage harm or benefit multiplied by the assets under management for each investment bank in year t.  The entire 
equation is shown for completeness and is estimated in the following way: for each fund we compute time-varying alphas with a seven factor model estimated with a time-varying parameter model. For each fund we obtain an 
alpha for each month and average the alphas over the months in each year. We estimate this alpha for all funds owned by the conglomerate or investment bank excluding fund of funds, index funds, money market funds, and 
municipal bond funds. We regress the seven factor alphas on dummy variables for investment banks (Investment  Bank), institutional funds (dIN), hedge funds (dHF), mutual funds (dMF), equity funds (dEquity), and 
continuous variables: fees charged (Fee), the natural log of fees times assets under management [Ln(Revenue)], the natural log of age of fund [Ln(Age)], the natural log of assets under management [Ln(Aum)], the natural log 
of assets under management for an organization [Ln(Aum Org)], the number of portfolios of the fund type (institutional, hedge fund or mutual fund) divided by the number of portfolios of all funds under management by the 
firm (Industry Concentration). We include two interaction variables- the investment banking dummy variable times fee dispersion (Fee Dispersion * dIB) and the investment banking dummy variable times the percentage 
number of lead loans (% Nr Lead Loans * dIB). Regressions are estimated with the restriction: dIN+dHF+dMF=0. Standard errors are clustered by investment bank or conglomerate and estimated with robust estimators. “*” 
indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level; “**” indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level; “***” indicates the coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
  
Economic 
benefit or 
(loss) 
  Investment  Bank 
Fee Dispersion 
*dIB 
% Nr Lead 
Loans*dIB   dIN dHF dMF dEquity Fee Ln(Revenue) Ln(Age) Ln(Aum) Ln(Aum Org) 
Industry 
Concentration Constant R
2 N 
1990  $ -3,154    -0.1688**    0.1236   -0.0543    -0.0232   0.1024   -0.0793   0.0654    0.0009    0.2044    0.0369   -0.0274  -0.0349*    0.0110   0.1182  0.0252 759 
1991  $ -4,032    -0.1080   0.1063    0.0770     -0.0643  0.1835*   -0.1192***   0.1324**   -0.0097  -0.0156   0.0320   -0.0217  -0.0236   0.0152   -0.0216  0.0324 904 
1992  $ -3,128    -0.0896   0.1200   -0.1363    -0.0367  0.2083**   -0.1716***   0.2906***   -0.0188   0.1150   -0.0551   0.0087    0.0295   -0.0025  -0.3021  0.0807 1,118 
1993  $  3,982      0.0032   -0.1051   0.0068     -0.0522  0.2164**   -0.1642***   0.5242***    0.0393    0.1018   -0.0353  0.0703***    0.0108    0.0042   -0.6047***  0.153 1,505 
1994  $  1,571     -0.1035  -0.1154  0.3046**     -0.0055   0.0605   -0.0551  0.2495***   -0.1917***    0.1035    0.0499   0.1313***   -0.0398**   -0.0137  -0.3379  0.0870 1,778 
1995  $ -4,409    -0.1674  -0.1521*   0.4866**     -0.0648   0.0625    0.0023   -0.0274  -0.2930***    0.0164    0.0490    0.0332   -0.0366**   -0.0284*   0.4438*  0.0510 2,008 
1996  $ -11,613    -0.1662*   -0.0689   0.1431     -0.0144   0.0245   -0.0101  -0.0429  -0.2245***    0.1081   -0.0237   0.0307    0.0033   -0.0152  0.1096  0.0349 2,290 
1997  $ -17,586    -0.2717*   -0.0503   0.0560     -0.0210  -0.0245   0.0455   -0.1262**   -0.4223***    0.3377   0.0687*   -0.0113  -0.0371*   -0.0303  0.6435***  0.0527 2,556 
1998  $ -17,930    -0.1205  -0.0743  -0.1651    -0.0106   0.0449   -0.0342  -0.0839*   -0.2891***    0.1554   0.1250***   -0.1082***   -0.0669***   -0.0321*   1.1073***  0.0379 2,815 
1999  $ -5,803    -0.0306  -0.0195   0.2142     -0.0474  0.1526*   -0.1052**   -0.0060  -0.1867***   -0.0596   0.0488   -0.1106***   -0.0132  -0.0318*   0.8942***  0.0336 3,118 
2000  $ -4,827    -0.0706   0.0252   0.3470*     -0.0858**   0.2084***   -0.1226***   -0.1597***   -0.2269***   -0.0823   0.0537   -0.0368**   -0.0222  -0.0243  0.6717***  0.0531 3,400 
2001  $  3,506     -0.0338   0.0423    0.1891     -0.0582   0.1209   -0.0627  -0.3205***   -0.1986***   -0.0552   0.0220   -0.0393   0.0047   -0.0092  0.4235*  0.0758 3,630 
2002  $  6,366      0.0384    0.0444   0.2308**     -0.0140   0.0423   -0.0282  -0.3450***   -0.0920**   -0.2113*    0.0042   -0.0471***    0.0159   -0.0038  0.2937  0.0876 3,744 
2003  $  2,877      0.1082    0.0283    0.0345      0.0095   -0.0094  -0.0002  -0.2466***   -0.0846***   -0.2348*   0.0379*   -0.0524***   -0.0033   0.0034   0.2763*  0.0624 3,756 
2004  $ -1,805     0.0150    0.0385   0.1423**      0.0159   -0.0101  -0.0058  -0.1328***   -0.0679***   -0.1358   0.0380   -0.0600***   -0.0026   0.0105   0.1940  0.0288 3,720 
2005  $ -7,439    -0.0111   0.0028    0.1394     0.1056***   -0.1421***    0.0365    0.0235    0.0157   -0.1165  0.0472**   -0.0656***   -0.0114   0.0064   0.2388*  0.0318 3,717 
2006  $ -9,788     0.0728    0.0027    0.1268     0.0841***   -0.0909**    0.0068   0.1271***   0.0525**   -0.3274***    0.0183   -0.0040   0.0017   -0.0052  -0.0175  0.0312 3,713 
2007  $ -9,833     0.0554   -0.1160   0.0647     0.0727***   -0.1069**    0.0342    0.0354    0.0191   -0.2499**   -0.0214  0.0649***    0.0229   -0.0201*   -0.2115  0.0389 3,515 
2008  $ -10,386     0.0057   -0.1223  -0.0127    0.0657**   -0.1649***   0.0991***   -0.0887**   -0.0469  -0.0762  -0.0292  0.0761***    0.0307   -0.0148  -0.3649**  0.0434 3,235 
Total   $ -93,430                                     
Per Year  $ -4,917                                     
 
